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Regulating the post-independence textile trade: Anglo-Indian tariff negotiations from 
Independence to the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. 
Abstract 
Based upon UK and Indian government archives the paper innovatively informs our 
understanding of business/state relationships in the areas of the regulation of post-colonial 
international trade. The abandonment of Imperial Preference for tariff protection in Britain 
proved problematic in the case of Indian textile industry whose entry into the British market, 
tariff free under Imperial Preference, was being replaced first by quota regulations and then by 
duties from the early 1970s.  This paper examines the negotiations between British and Indian 
textile interests in the period before the Multi-Fibre Arrangement as an environment where 
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Government 
Regulating the post-independence textile trade: Anglo-Indian tariff negotiations from 
Independence to the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. 
Introduction 
The introduction of Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) in 1974 was the culmination of international 
negotiations which sought to protect declining domestic industries of the advanced Western 
economies of Europe and North America from import competition from newly industrialising 
developing economies. Textiles as an example of an industry of the first industrial revolution 
that was particularly vulnerable to international competition from emergent economies acts as 
a key example of this process. The Anglo-Indian and the MFA provides a case study for our 
understanding of the relationship between governments’ management of economic transitions 
within their own economies and their management of international trade between economies 
to response to their domestic concerns.  
However, this case also suggests that the regulation of the textile trade between Britain and 
India, whilst an important example of this form of regulation, cannot be understood in the 
traditional simplistic contextualisation of competition between the developed and developing 
economies. Indian producers and the Indian state were not simply powerless recipients of 
decisions made by dominant western powers. Instead Indian producers rapidly moved into 
higher technology production and internationalised production of low cost textiles in order to 
circumvent barriers to trade imposed by MFA. At the same time the Indian state actively 
encouraged production into higher value, export orientated artificial fibres. In doing so the 
paper questions the entrepreneurial failure identified in the historiography of the Indian textile 
industry and the failure of the Indian state in developing strategies to maintain employment in 
the sector. 
The growth of textile industries have historically been associated with the development of the 
first industrial revolution in modern economies (Goodman and Honeyman, 1988). Textiles not 
simply provided a means for industrial revolutions to develop internally within economies but 
also provided a mechanism for the growth of internationalisation of economies through the 
trade of raw materials, semi-finished products and finished consumer goods (Deane, 1979). 
Thus, the domestic development of indigenous textile industries and the subsequent domestic 
management of the transition from textiles into more complex manufacturing processes, 
combined with the management of the international textile trade, has consistently been the 
focus of government industrial and commercial policy in industrialising economies.  
In the case of Britain and India the political context within which the management of these 
trade relationships occurred from the end of the Second World War to the introduction of the 
MFA in 1974 was one in which the end of the British Empire and Indian independence, in 1947, 
ensured that Indian economic interests could no longer be subordinated as easily to those of 
British industrial interests, as had been the case under Empire. As a result the attempts of the 
British government to dictate terms of trade to the Indian government by limiting imports of 
low value goods were met with an the economic reality that saw Indian producers responding 
proactively by organising production into higher value adding sectors of the trade. In doing so 
the Indian producers were replicating changing patterns of production which British producers 
had followed in the decades earlier when the first international competition emerged from 
Indian textile producers. 
The paper demonstrates that in both Britain and India government trade policies, aimed at 
protecting domestic employment while promoting industrialisation had very different impacts. 
While, both economies grappled with a similar problem; that of managing an economic 
transition from low value textile production into higher value internationally competitive textile 
production and simultaneously dealing with the emergence of competition from newer, lower 
cost centres of production. In this respect the question faced by the Indian government and the 
Indian textile industries were in many respects similar to that of the British industries.  
The following sections of the paper show how India’s industrialisation before independence 
came to be understood as highly racialized with the promotion of indigenous ownership 
becoming one of the key themes dominating political thinking before and after 1947. The paper 
then examines the role played by the Indian government’s industrial policy in protecting 
domestic employment and demand along with promoting export led growth. The paper then 
turns to the problem the British government faced in managing Indian imports into the British 
market. Using original archival sources from the Indian and British governments’ archives the 
paper demonstrates how the regulation of Anglo-Indian international trade in textiles was used 
to manage industrial development in both economies. The paper concludes that whilst 
international regulation restricted Indian exports of low value textiles into British markets 
rather than protecting British producers it promoted trade diversion, with Indian manufacturers 
of low cost production moving to countries exempt from British import restrictions and 
simultaneously encouraged the development to higher value adding production of textile 
exports amongst the Indian producers.  
Independence and the industrialisation of the Indian Economy 
Indian development during the colonial period before independence in 1947 was characterised 
by an economy with world leading sectors yet set within a wider economy with limited 
indigenous development of modern industries. Already by the mid-twentieth century India had 
become the world’s largest tea producer and the centre for global production of other 
commodities including jute, cardamonn and ginger. In a yet wider area of agricultural exports 
India also held a dominant world position including coffee, rubber, cashews and pepper 
(Agarwala, 2002, p.535). Beyond agricultural exports and the textile-based industries of the first 
industrial revolution Indian industrialisation until 1947 was however much more limited 
(Bacghi, 1982). In so far as industries of the second and third industrial revolutions were 
concerned Indian business was highly dependent upon the foreign direct investment (FDI) of 
British, European and American multinationals. It was not until the interwar period before 1940 
that investment by Indian firms in capital intensive processing industries began to emerge. 
Originating from the reinvestment of profits made by the managing agencies during the First 
World War firms such as the Tata Iron and Steel Company developed prior to 1940. (Ramnath, 
2012, pp.62-6). Nevertheless, in more technically advanced sectors such as chemicals and 
dyestuffs, while its history could be dated back to the 1880s, the industry remained dominated 
by the European multinational companies of Bayer, BASG, and Hoechst, the British company ICI 
and the US firms Du Pont, Monsanto and Carbide until the 1970s. The same role for FDI can also 
be seen in the oil and car industries (Agarwala, 2002, pp.531-551). Thus colonial rule was 
understood to be restricting indigenous development to primarily agricultural goods production 
for export with the Indian domestic economy restricted to becoming a market for advanced 
manufacturing of European multinationals rather than a centre of global production in its own 
right. 
Once independence was won the state therefore took a much greater interventionist and 
developmental approach to industrialisation. State monopolies in key industrial sectors, 
including in iron and steel, the manufacture of telephone and telegraph networks and mineral 
oils were formed along with regulation and control over 18 further private industries following 
the 1948 Industrial Policy Statement. The Industrial Policy Statement was then reinforced with 
three further measures, Industrial licensing from 1951, government protection for infant 
industries and finally Import substitution in what Tripathi has described as the ‘four pillars’ of 
post-independence industrial policy. (2007, pp.282-325)  
In so far as indigenous industrial enterprises had developed in areas of textile production 
including cotton and jute the large firms that had emerged were dominated by diversified firms 
in which a management structure encouraged the separation of ownership and control. The 
managing agency structure ensured private finance from individual shareholders was 
centralised in a managing agency while third party firms were contracted to own and manage 
production units and so a divorce of ownership from control was an essential element of these 
large organisations. Agency organisations derived a fee from the principal investors for their 
operation of the agency relationship. As Wearmouth (2014) describes, the ‘managing agent was 
a firm delegated by another firm’s principals [shareholders] with responsibility for the day-to-
day operational management in return for a fee, often a commission on the managed firm’s 
sales or profits. (2014, p.42). In doing so the agency’s management held significant sway in both 
the creation and distribution of profits and returns to the principal investors. But as a 
consequence the managing agency firm did not then have access to capital markets 
independently of the principal investors. 
One consequence of this structure was Misra (1999) maintains that while indigenous Indian 
capital rapidly flowed into managing agencies in sectors where export markets had emerged, 
especially in cotton, jute, tea and other agricultural goods, this led to a highly racially 
segregated form of industrial capitalism in India itself and limited diversification opportunities 
into more technically advanced and capital intensive sectors (1999, pp.210-14). Marcovits 
(1985) shows the inter-connectedness of the managing agencies through a system of 
interlocking directorships  and whilst Chandavarkar (1985) challenges the normative 
assumption of a defined path of industrialisation it is difficult to resist Misra’s conclusion that 
the managing agency structure while highly effective at developing specific export focused 
sectors simultaneously hindering wider Indian industrialisation. 
As Indian independence arrived indigenous Indian business was identified as ‘behave[ing] more 
like speculators and traders than industrialists’ (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce, 
1999, p.159) requiring an interventionist and developmental state to foster domestic 
industrialisation. This was compounded by the economic dislocation of the catastrophic events 
involving the partition between India and Pakistan (Khan, 2007). Partition disproportionately 
impacted on the agency firms operating in the textile sectors of cotton and jute separating the 
areas of raw material production from the areas of manufacturing across the newly formed 
states’ boundaries. In cotton of 394 cotton mills only 14 were in Pakistan after 1947 but almost 
all the raw cotton originated in Sind and west Punjab provinces of Pakistan (Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce, 1999, p.154). The significance of this impact can be understood 
from the fact that in the case of cotton domestic demand in 1947 after partition was twice that 
of domestic production (Singh, 1999, p.139). Similarly for jute 81 % of raw jute production took 
place in East Pakistan (subsequently Bangladesh) yet 100% of jute processing mills were in the 
newly formed state of India. 
Regulating the domestic textiles industry: 1947 to the Textile Plan 
The textile industry has remained throughout the twentieth century of crucial importance to 
the Indian economy. Fifty years after independence it still accounted for one fifth of total 
industrial output of the economy yet only contributing some four per cent to GDP and only 2.3 
per cent of world trade in textiles (Nageswara Rao, 1999, p.117). The textile industry was 
deemed to be one of the 18 industries identified in the 1948 Industrial Policy Statement to be 
important for the national interest and in 1951 also came under the Industries (Development 
and Regulation) Act for allocating import and raw material licenses. Controls introduced over 
the industry during the Second World War were retained in the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order 
in 1948 and remained in operation for the next four decades. Misra (1993) suggests that the 
Indian textile industry was probably one of the most tightly regulated industries in the world 
(1993, p.24). He charts the post-independence evolution of India’s domestic textile policy 
through the development of 5 related policy goals; the regulation of intersectoral competition, 
the provision of cheap cloth, the Fibre policy, modernisation and lastly the rehabilitation of ‘sick 
mills’.  
Economic dislocation after 1947 and the low levels of industrial development saw government 
undertake a systematic attempt to direct investment into industrial production. In the case of 
cotton the areas under cultivation increased 55 per cent from 58.8 to 90.06 lakh1 hectares with 
a corresponding increase in output of 422 per cent from 1951-1997 (Singh, 1999, p.140). By the 
1990s India was the third largest producer of raw cotton behind China and the United States 
(Karunakaran Pillai, 1999, p.160). 
The low value adding of the manufacturing elements within the sector acted as an impediment 
to the industry’s potential to act as a key sector in the development of higher technology 
industries such that little development took place associated with related and supporting 
industries. Profits from the sector were instead used to diversify into other extractive and 
agricultural industries, such as coal and tea production, by the managing agents dominating the 
larger firms and thus provided evidence for the criticism of weak Indian entrepreneurship both 
pre- and post-independence. Raw material costs thus continued to constitute the 
overwhelmingly largest component to total costs in these low capital intensive production 
technologies. Across all textile sectors from cotton to silk, jute to woollen products raw material 
expenditure constitutes a minimum of fifty per cent of total sales and in some areas such as 
textile processing as much as 80 per cent (Nageswara Rao, 1999, table 10). 
The diversity of production technologies included modern mill production encompassing 
‘composite’ mills engaged in both weaving and spinning sitting alongside traditional handloom 
production at home or in small scale factory settings, powerloom production in specialised 
weaving factories and fine hosiery production in knitting factory production settings. Domestic 
industrial policy therefore identified two specific areas for intervention, employment and 
productivity enhancing investment. 
Protection of the continued employment of handloom weaving and their evolutionary 
transition from handloom to powerloom weaving was one of the government’s policy goals 
with limitations placed on the growth of the higher productivity industrial production methods 
embodied in composite mill operations. Thus, while composite mill expansion was blocked 
powerloom take up was such that from 1951-64 a six fold increase took place according to 
official estimates (Misra, 1993, pp.24-45). As a result while the larger composite mills were 
responsible for the production of 80 per cent of cloth in the 1950s this had fallen to just 20 per 
cent by 1989 (Misra, 1993, p.120). However the production from the composite mills was still of 
major importance to the industry’s export development as almost all exports derived from just 
10-12 of the private composite mills (Karunakaran Pillai, 1999, p.161). 
Price controls operated in the industry to ensure cheap cloth was available within the domestic 
market. Limiting prices first through voluntary means and then through statutory measures 
after 1964 impacted on the profitability of mills leading to the creation of loss making ‘sick’ 
mills.  The impact of a lack of rationalisation and capital investment in new large-scale 
productive technologies led to an environment whereby relatively low cost entry could take 
place. Over supply of output and falling prices in periods of growth led to mill closures and 
mothballing of plant in what was described as ‘sick mills’. 
Protection of agricultural employment also impacted on innovation within the industry. Not 
only did the composite mills not invest in new technology but the Fibre Policy preventing the 
use of non-cotton fibres had the additional impact of limiting the development of a domestic 
market for the synthetic fibre industry in the 1960s within the composite mills sector.  
Growing industry concerns over profitability by the 1970s saw greater government regulation 
on the industry with the development of the Cotton Corporation of India in 1970 as a state 
trading body aimed at seeking to boost marketing and sales in order to alleviate the sick mill 
phenomena. The creation of the National Textile Corporation also saw direct government 
ownership emerge in the sector with the taking over of 103 sick mills by 1973. Further 
intervention followed in 1985 with the introduction of the Textile Policy. This development 
sought to address failings in the private sector through investment and modernisation. The 
Textile Policy provided further financial support for rationalisation and modernisation 
conditional upon enforcement of managerial and labour changes to alter work practices (Misra, 
1993, 130: Bacghi and Das, 2014). 
Overall Indian government policy towards the textile industry while aiming to encourage 
production of raw materials and also that of modern small-scale production technologies as a 
means to manage employment levels also deterred development of large-scale integrated 
technologies. The industry was one in which state control and latterly ownership under the 
National Textile Corporation played an increasingly dominant role in the industry from the 
1950s onwards. Attempts at industry level co-ordination were facilitated by government but 
increasingly failed to resolve the problems of the industry and more direct intervention 
incrementally emerged as a policy response in different economies (Ditt and Pollard, 1992; 
Tomlinson, Morelli and Wright, 2011: Bagchi and Das, 2014). 
The experience of the domestic Indian textile industry from the 1950s through to the 1990s was 
in many ways therefore similar to that of many other established textile industries in the 
developed world. Singleton’s work (1990: 1991) on the Lancashire cotton industry identifies 
similar problems of adjustment while Tomlinson, Morelli and Wright (2011) chart the 
management of this decline in the case of the Scottish jute industry. Problems of maintaining 
employment while promoting modernisation and rationalisation were difficult to solve within 
diverse and highly fragmented sectors. What is identified as entrepreneurial failure in the 
Indian experience can be readily identified as operating in other mature textile industries, such 
as in the UK and Europe more widely, and may reflect more accurately the industry’s 
entrepreneur’s recognition of the lack of opportunity for profit in the industry.  Where new 
opportunities emerged, particularly in the development of artificial fibres investment was not 
slow in emerging. Indian producers were gaining government licences for the production of 
polypropylene, rayon, polyester and other synthetic yarns and fibres from the early 1970s 
onwards (Indian Government Department of Commerce and Industry, Industrial Policy and 
Promotion 276, 1973-5). Thus, if there was an entrepreneurial failure in textiles manufacturing 
it must be identified as an international phenomena (Morelli, 2014). 
Not all agree with this analysis. Wolf (1982, p.50) for instance concludes that exports of textile 
manufacturers in general and cotton goods in particular were a lost opportunity for the Indian 
economy before the 1970s. This is predicated on the view that Indian modernisation and 
industrialisation in its production technologies would not have impacted on domestic 
employment levels due to their sole focus upon export markets and, in addition, that increased 
export potential would have found access to the growing markets of the developed economies, 
particularly those of Britain, Western Europe and the United States. Yet a central part of the 
explanation of the limited success of Indian government’s domestic policy towards the textile 
industry lies with the fact that the domestic Indian textile industry was itself linked to and an 
integrated part of a wider global trade in raw material production, unfinished cloth and finished 
garments (Vanathi and Swamynathan, 2014). As such international regulation of the trade 
played a large part in determining the ability of firms (and the Indian government) to influence 
the development of the domestic industry.  
Within the international regulatory environment Indian interests were also much less powerful 
than those of first world governments and firms. Whilst new international production centres, 
such as Hong Kong in the 1950s, Bangladesh in the 1970s and still more recently China, could 
emerge it was at the expense of existing centres of production that these developments took 
place due to the fact that the international regulation limited potential growth opportunities of 
existing centres. As a result increasing output of low cost raw materials, yarns and unfinished 
cloth acted to encourage the development of producers in newly industrialising economies 
rather than within India itself. It is to the regulation of the international trade and in particular 
linkages between the British and Indian industries that we therefore now turn. 
Market regulation after 1945: Negotiating Anglo-Indian Textile Trade 
The post Second World War settlement in Europe was ideologically predicated on the 
development of deeper trading relationships between the conflicting powers under the 
premise that trading nations were less likely to resolve conflict militarily. Thus, Milward 
identifies the development of the Marshall Aid programme, the European Iron and Steel 
Agreement and the European Payments Union in 1950 leading to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 as 
central to our understanding of the European rescue of the nation state (MIlward, 1992: 
Aldcroft, 1993). This regulatory framework extended into a wider range of other industries 
including agriculture with the Common Agricultural Policy and also that of the textile industries 
with common tariffs on imports of raw materials and finished goods (Aldcroft, 1993, p.150).  In 
the British case despite its refusal to participate in the developing Common Market similar 
regulatory frameworks emerged. Again the emphasis of regulation on the British textile 
industry can be broadly understood in terms of the promoting domestic investment leading to 
rationalisation and the boosting of productivity, the encouragement of export capabilities and 
consequentially the maintenance and management of full-employment (Grove, 1962: 
Cairncross and Watts, 1989: Singleton, 1991). 
In the case of the British textile industries Rose (1997) and Dupree (1992) show, particularly for 
the cotton industry, that the development of any new regulatory framework after 1945 was 
impeded by the continuation of pre-existing colonial economic relationships and in particular 
imperial preference. Imperial preference ensured a free trade area existed within the British 
Empire, and later the Commonwealth countries, but in the post-war era acted to impede the 
development of trade relationships outside the Commonwealth economies for both British and 
Indian firms. In the context of textiles this relationship meant that the British government acted 
to seek protection for domestic producers who inevitably faced a cost disadvantage relative to 
Indian imports. 
The British Government’s Board of Trade (BoT) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
together played a major role in the Anglo-Indian textile trade negotiations. Immediately after 
British government controls were relaxed in 1954 the cotton industry began to demand further 
protection from the threat of rising Indian imports of ‘grey cotton’. Unbleached or dyed and 
unprinted cloth imports, referred to as ‘grey cotton’, imports were encouraged by those parts 
of the textile trade linked to processing rather than the manufacture of grey cloth whereas 
those parts of the trade producing cloth from raw cotton or cotton yarn were facing cost 
disadvantages in this environment. In the case of both the British cotton and jute industries the 
dominant voice of these trades originated from those firms who were spinners and weavers of 
raw materials with firms whose only role was garment production from finished cloth having 
less of an influence. With Indian imports accounting for half of all UK imports of grey cotton 
cloth any change in import regulations, duty or quota restrictions would inevitably place a 
heavy strain on the development of Anglo-Indian trading relationships (PRO BT 11/ 5606, 1st 
March 1955). 
Immediately upon the withdrawal of wartime restrictions on the economy in 1954 concerns 
over the impact of low cost textile imports became a focus for government thinking. Potential 
retaliation involving ‘the whole shooting match’ could develop from the Indian Congress if the 
British government raised restrictions warned Jha, the Indian Joint Secretary for Commerce and 
Industries, in discussions with Board of Trade officials in 1954 (PRO BT 11/ 5606, 13th October 
1954). Whilst initially resistant to renewed intervention within three years the Board of Trade 
had accepted that avoiding action was no longer a viable strategy. As Board officials recognised 
‘… after years of skilful fencing, [we] have reached a point where we have to decide whether or 
not the Lancashire cotton industry is to be protected.’ (BT205/234, 24th June 1957). Initial 
attempts to develop industry level co-ordination referred to as the ‘Crossley Plan’ faced 
difficulty from the fact that Crown Immunity would be required for a new collusive agreement 
following the passing of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act (BT 258/742, 3rd June 1958).  
The textile industry posed a significant dilemma for the British government’s approach to 
industrial policy in the late 1950s. While government was moving towards increasing 
competition policy and the abandonment of industry level collusive agreements, as a means to 
force private industry to act more competitively, it was increasingly identifying the need to 
sanction the development of more restrictive collusive agreements in order to address the lack 
of competitiveness within the differing sectors of the textile industry. In the case of the British 
jute sector of the industry whilst the introduction of competition policy in 1956 was the catalyst 
for internal transformation such transitions were complex and took place over extensive time 
periods. Direct government import controls had been regulated through the continuation of 
wartime body Jute Control beginning in 1941 and not ending until 1969 (Morelli, 2014). In the 
case of the alteration of international relationships such transitions took place over a much 
longer timeframe. In cotton, wartime controls introduced in 1941 with the formation of the 
Cotton Board evolved into the 1962 quota agreements which itself evolved into duty tariffs in 
1972 and ultimately the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) after 1974 (Singleton 1991; Rose, 
1997; Morelli, 2013). As Beckerman argues this approach was however dictated by domestic 
rather than international concerns (1972, p.148). 
The Board of Trade’s attitude to the differing textile sectors was not however uniform.  
Recognising the political importance of the wider and larger Lancashire cotton industry ensured 
cotton had greater political weight than was the case in other sectors. As Board of Trade 
officials recognised political campaigning by the Labour Party in Lancashire meant government 
had to behave more sympathetically. In addition their less sympathetic approach to the decline 
of the jute production, concentrated just in the Scottish city of Dundee, might then also be used 
as a bargaining offer with Indian officials. As the President of the Board of Trade recognised ‘We 
are about to help India over jute and it might be that the Indian Government, whom we are 
bound to consult, would agree to a reasonable cotton quota.’ (PRO BT205/234, 25th June 1957). 
As described above in the Indian textile industry the British industry also saw similar attempts 
at controlling imports. However, while the British government could unilaterally impose tariff 
protection on textile imports from non-Commonwealth countries it had to seek agreement on 
bi-lateral voluntary quota restrictions on finished imports from Commonwealth economies.  
Quota controls were agreed by 1962 limiting Indian imports of cotton cloth and continued until 
1972 when regulation moved to financial duties on imports rather than quantity-based controls 
from Commonwealth countries. As the British textile industry became more integrated and 
larger firms dominated both production of untreated grey cloth and that of finished garments 
this shift was a reflection of the changing requirements of protectionist policies. Tariff 
protection now took the form of restricting finished products rather than raw materials with 
tariff ramping identifying the extent of processing by the exporting economy for the level of 
duty. Anthony Crosland MP, as President of the Board of Trade, had signalled the move away 
from quotas to tariffs in a speech to the House of Commons in July 1969. From 1972 a tariff was 
to be imposed on imported cotton, which was to fall heavily on Indian producers amounting to 
a 7.5% tariff on cotton yarn, 15% on cloth and 17% on most garments (PRO FCO67/537, 1972).  
The British government’s move towards application and entry into the European Common 
Market also provided a further rationale for the shift in tariff policy. Common Market entry 
required a common external duty-based tariff barrier by all member states.  As a result the 
need to ‘modify’ and abandon the quota agreements became a policy goal particularly of the 
British government but also accepted by other Commonwealth economies by the late 1960s 
(Cairncross and Nita, 1989, p.96-7).  
As with the original introduction of quantitative restrictions the dominant position of the British 
government in the negotiations ensured Indian economic interests were secondary. The FCO 
calculated that by 1970 India imports totalled £106m, of which £8m were imports of tea duty 
free, £12m of cotton goods which were regulated via bi-lateral quotas, £26m of other goods 
incurring tariff duties for the protection of British manufacturers and £30m of other goods with 
no tariff protection. Indian imports accounted for 53% of total cotton imports under the 
Commonwealth quota arrangements (PRO FCO67/537, 1971). Again, as with the debates in the 
1950s, government concerns over insufficient investment, low productivity growth and 
continuing high unemployment in the domestic cotton textile area of Lancashire provided the 
rationale for further government intervention. The publication of the Textile Council's Report 
on Cotton and Allied Textiles in 1969 acted to provide government with the validation required 
to move away from quota restrictions on cotton imports to duty protection as it sought a 
means to both address the sector’s concerns and in preparation for future entry into the 
Common Market (PRO FCO67/718, 1972). 
Board of Trade and Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials nevertheless recognised that 
the move to greater restrictions on textile imports would have a significant impact on the 
Indian cotton producers. Crosland himself recognised the problem and stated that the   
‘Government will … when the time comes to determine the level of aid to India after 1972, take 
into account, against the background of India's general aid requirements at that time, any 
adverse effects on her exports arising from the tariff’ (Hansard, 1969, p. 1509).  
However Crosland’s stated intention of providing aid in compensation for the dislocation of 
trade proved more controversial within government itself. Opposition from within the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for Overseas Development Aid (ODA) 
developed on the issue of compensation to Indian producers for the loss of markets. The FCO 
were concerned that any payments might set a precedent for other economies in their 
negotiations with the British government while the ODA sought to avoid explicitly linking aid to 
compensation for changes in trade relations and trade negotiations. Thus, in a letter from 
officials at the ODA to the FCO setting out the principals for negotiations FCO officials included 
the hand written instruction that  ‘None of the above should of course be passed to the Indians’ 
(PRO FCO67/373, 1970). 
A further element in the negotiations between the British and Indian governments lay in the 
potential diversion of production from tariff to non-tariff produced goods. The FCO were keen 
to ensure that ‘We should not say anything which they [the Indian government - author’s 
addition] could interpret as encouragement to invest in man-made fibre capacity … in the belief 
that they would find a ready market in the UK’ (PRO FCO 67/141, 1969). This was especially the 
case as the FCO were further concerned that the offer of £10m additional aid for the changes 
might provide producers with the investment required for such diversification (PRO CO67/718, 
1972, p.4). Yet despite British government concerns Indian producers were already making 
these decisions independently and grasping the new opportunities in artificial fibres. Garwara 
Nylons Ltd of Bombay gained government licences for the production of polyester in December 
1973, Rajasthan State Industries Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. of Jaipur and Sri Sakthi 
Textiles Ltd in Pollachi were similarly was licenced to produce synthetic yarns and fabrics 
respectively in 1975 while the manufacture of polypropylene was being pursued from 1973 
(NIA, Department of Commerce and Industry, Industrial Policy and Promotion 276, 1973-5). 
Anglo-Indian negotiations over the regulation of bi-lateral trade was mirrored by and eventually 
superseded by multi-lateral regulation. The 1974 Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) can be 
understood as a culmination of these processes towards multi-lateral regulation of trading 
arrangements. The MFA itself was a multi-lateral arrangement to limit imports from the 
developing economies into the developed economies of the United States, Britain and the 
European Union. The MFA was also the outcome of a process preceded by the Short Term 
Arrangement in 1961 and the Long Term Arrangements in 1962 both of which were organised 
with the United States (Bagchi, 2004, p.25). The MFA subsequently then went through a series 
of changes with new arrangements being negotiated every three years (Majmudar, 1989). 
These changes were generally to tighten the voluntary export restrictions placed on exporting 
countries and to extend the restrictions across an increasingly specific and targeted range of 
textile products. The British government’s response to these agreements, while in general 
favourable, was that they failed to offer sufficient protection for its textile industries, 
particularly that of cotton. However Prime Minister Jim Callaghan accepted the view that the 
renewal of the MFA arrangement and the additional continuation of Common Market 
restrictions on imports provided the greatest protectionism available (PRO PREM 16 1470, 
1977). The alternative was further isolation of the United Kingdom’s interests in the Common 
Market and fears of a rapid increase of imports without restriction if no agreement was 
reached. As David Owen, Foreign Secretary wrote to Prime Minister Jim Callaghan in December 
1977 ‘There would be bitterness if another blow were struck at the community’s credibility. The 
United Kingdom would … be entirely isolated and should not expect autonomous measures to 
look after the United Kingdom’s interests. (PRO PREM 16 1470, David Owens MP to Prime 
Minister Jim Callaghan, 16th December 1977). 
Majmudar’s (1989) study of Indian textile exports following the introduction of the MFA 
suggests that the impact of tightening quota restrictions and rising duty tariffs failed to limit 
imports. Indeed evidence suggests Indian imports increased and the Indian textile industry 
responded by increasing value added production into garment production and away from raw 
material and unfinished cloth production (Karunakaran Pillai, 1999, p.167). Between 1976 and 
1985 the number of firms exporting grew from 3,929 to 8,260 (Majmudar, 1989, table 4). In 
each of the three periods the MFA was re-negotiated from 1976 to 1987 the value of exports 
also grew more rapidly than the volume of exports (Majmudar, 1989, p.5) while the 
concentration of Indian exports into restrained countries grew from 68.9% by value to 80.5% 
from 1985-1987 (Majmudar, 1989, table 5). 
Similarly in the area of artificial fibres Indian capabilities increased during this era. As with 
British producers Indian firms with weaving and textile knowledge readily diversified into 
artificial fibres once the market for these products emerged and the technological impediments 
to mass production were resolved. This again provided existing textile producers with 
opportunities to avoid areas of production where low value adding and low cost competition 
was developing. This process of diversification into higher capital intensity production methods 
also developed with the move away from the agency structure of ownership and management. 
Large Indian firms now began to develop more recognisable financial and managerial 
structures, whilst often retaining a high degree of family control (Tomlinson, 2003; Roy, 2017). 
 
Conclusions 
This paper suggests that the post-independence Indian textile industry’s evolution was a 
function of a number of domestic governmental political influences. Government action to 
protect domestic employment whilst promoting the development of more efficient production 
technologies was linked to the desire to encourage larger firms to focus upon export markets 
with more capital intensive technological production technologies. However the potential for 
larger Indian firms to gain access to international markets, primarily those in the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Europe was itself highly constrained by the rapid re-emergence 
of the regulation of trade at the bi-lateral and latterly multi-lateral levels. Quotas and duties 
were means by which the importing governments in the developed economies provided 
protection for their own indigenous, but declining, textile industries. As such this regulation 
acted as a means to slow and manage the decline of traditional textile industries in advanced 
economies in response to the cost advantages available to newly industrialising economies. Yet 
at the same time this limited the degree to which Indian producers could find profitable outlets 
for increased investment in larger mills. 
This highly constrained environment for established textile industries, such as those in India, led 
to the emergence of new centres of production facilitated by accessing the expansion of supply 
of low cost raw materials. These new centres initially also had the advantage of unconstrained 
access to developed markets outside of the quota agreements until they too were brought into 
the agreements framework via the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Once new low cost producers 
emerged the established Indian producers themselves moved towards higher value added 
garment manufacture and away from lower value unfinished cloth production. This was 
combined with the process of diversification into artificial textiles as larger firms took 
advantage of new opportunities combining their existing production capabilities with 
innovation in yarn production. Export led diversification was supported and promoted as part 
of the Indian government’s trade and commercial policies whilst protection of small scale 
domestic producers of traditional textiles continued. This developmental path of the Indian 
textile industry had previously been followed by textile industries in developed economies once 
low cost producers, India being a key example, emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Thus, the Indian textile industry’s development echoed many of the features of the textile 
industries developments in the advanced economies. However, viewing the demise of low 
value added textiles as economic failure within the domestic setting misses the wider global 
framework within which the industry was developing. Low value adding was giving way to 
higher value adding, domestic-focused production was giving way to internationally focused 
production technologies. Governments themselves in the developing world, as had been the 
case in the developed world, increasingly actively undertook the management of these 
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